RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POPULATION-AT-RISK

The United States has not had much recent experience with anthrax. The last outbreak, before the current one, occurred in 1957.  As new knowledge emerges, intervention and prevention strategies are being questioned.  The current outbreak features tiny spores, likely 1-2 microns (one millionth of a meter), which cling to surfaces and remain alive for long times.  The spore size and flying, clinging nature are much different than naturally-occurring outbreaks which feature larger spores that are less easily aerosolized. Once in a person's lungs, the tiny spores may lie dormant for long periods before changing from inactive spores into active bacteria.  Antibiotic have little effect on the spores but instead combat the active bacteria. Major questions remain.  What is the minimum number of anthrax spores that can infect a human?  How long should persons who possibly inhaled spores be treated in a preventive manner with antimicrobial therapy so that active bacteria are killed, once they emerge from spores?  Should such high-risk persons be vaccinated to develop immunity against active bacteria while being treated? 

Vaccination of Risk Groups

In evaluating scientific data from the few animal studies that have been done, government policymakers have decided to offer the anthrax vaccine to at-risk persons. Earlier this group had been advised to take antibiotics for 60 days, which may not be long enough. Officials feel that three groups of people should seriously consider more aggressive therapy (i.e., vaccination and/or 40-day antibiotic course following 60-day course). They are:

The three preventive options for persons with risks for inhalational anthrax are:

  1. 60 days of antimicrobial prophylaxis, accompanied by monitoring for illness;

  2. 40 additional days of antimicrobial prophylaxis (intended to provide protection against the theoretical possibility that anthrax spores might cause illness up to 100 days after exposure) accompanied by monitoring for illness or adverse reactions;

  3. 40 additional days of anti-microbial prophylaxis plus 3 doses of anthrax vaccine administered over a 4-week period.

 Although not a use approved by the Food and Drug Administration, the vaccine might provide additional protection by inducing an immune response to Bacillus anthracis. As an investigational new drug, the vaccine should be administered with informed consent, and vaccinated persons may participate in a follow-up evaluation measuring the effect of the vaccine when administered after exposure.

While the vaccine has known risks, the anthrax risk and vaccine benefits are both unknown. Those who are extremely worried about the risk for anthrax could decide to accept the vaccine risk. Persons less worried could decide to continue only with antibiotics (i.e., an extra 40 days), or take no new medicines. The final decision is being left by the government to the individual and his or her doctor. Because the vaccine has not been approved for post-exposure treatment, those wanting the vaccine must sign a consent form which accepts the potential risks.

Four prominent American newspapers describe the government's decision and the dilemma over inadequate information faced by exposed persons.

New York Times (12/19/01)

Wall Street Journal (12/19/01)

Washington Post (12/19/01)

Washington Post editorial (12/19/01)

Los Angeles Times (12/19/01)

The initial reaction to the availability of the vaccine was described the following day, as people voice their frustrations over epidemiologic uncertainty. 

Washington Post-1 (12/20/01)

Washington Post-2 (12/20/01)

New York Times (12/20/01)

New York Times editorial (12/20/01)

Wall Street Journal (12/21/01)

The Centers for Disease Control attempted to address the fears and concerns of exposed persons, yet worries remain.

Click for news account of CDC efforts (12/21/01)

Click for news account of postal worker reactions (12/22/01)

Click for news account of worries in Connecticut (12/22/01)

Click for news account of low acceptance of vaccine (12/31/01)

Click for news account of vaccine rejection by NY postal workers (1/4/02)

Click for news account of vaccine rejection by civilians (1/8/02)

Click for news account of CDC's view of diminishing risk (1/11/02)

Click for news account of CDC's vaccination disappointment (1/18/02)

Click for news account of consequences of non-adherence (3/8/02)

Use of Antimicrobial Prophylaxis by Risk Groups

What follows is CDC's earlier recommendation for people potentially exposed to Bacillus anthracis aerosols in Florida, New Jersey, New York City, Virginia or Washington DC. These recommendations were for persons at risk for inhalational anthrax.  Such risk occurs first when there has been an inhalational case at work or other facility where people have contact. An example is the media company in Florida where cases 5 and 7 occurred.  Second, risk occurs when environmental specimens positive for B. anthracis in facilities along the path of a contaminated letter in which aerosolization might have occurred.  An example is the postal facilities in New York City or New Jersey as typlified by cases 11 through 13 (case 10 earlier was in this group but later removed from the outbreak).  Third, people are at risk where there is exposure to an air space known to be contaminated with aerosolized B. anthracis from an opened letter.  Typical of this category was the Senate office building in Washington DC and case 20.  CDC recommended that person in these three risk groups receive a full 60-day course of antimicrobial prophylaxis.

The organization went on to provide specific recommendations by site. These include:

In addition, CDC recommended a 60-day course of antimicrobial prophylaxis for other workers with specified risks for inhalational anthrax. In some areas, local health authorities facilitated access to a 60-day course of antimicrobial prophylaxis for persons who handled mail in facilities from which B. anthracis was isolated but did not have exposures for which antimicrobial prophylaxis is recommended. These persons may choose or may be directed by local health authorities to discontinue antimicrobial prophylaxis before completing a 60-day course.

Evaluation

CDC is evaluating the program to distribute antimicrobial agents and assessing adverse events and adherence. The objectives of this evaluation are to assess the provision of antimicrobial agents and educational materials to affected persons, to determine adverse events associated with the antimicrobial agents, and to characterize adherence to the recommended regimen. Starting in late January 2002, a brief telephone interview will be conducted by RTI International (contracted by CDC) of all persons for whom postexposure antibiotic prophylaxis was recommended. The survey will take about 8 weeks.  The information from this evaluation will be critical to CDC's effort to improve the technical assistance and supplies needed with future anthrax postexposure prophylaxis campaigns and to comply with Food and Drug Administration regulations for monitoring for adverse events.

Click for program announcement in MMWR (1/25/02)

Follow-up

Scholars will be reviewing what took place in the American Anthrax Outbreak of 2001, and provide thoughts on correct and incorrect actions.  As these views become available, material will be added to this section.

Click for news of Science article on value of early antibiotic treatment (3/8/02)